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I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Charter prohibits "the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."'
This is the great peace principle of international law, described by
Professor Thomas Franck as "the apex of the global normative system...
"2 States then may be entitled to peace, and if - a very large if -
collective security systems can be made fully operative, states may be
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1. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
2. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AMER. J.
INT'L L. 46, 88 (1992).
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entitled to "protection against aggression . . ." Though the leap from
states rights and obligations to individual rights and obligations is not one
that international law makes very often, we may be moving towards a legal
regime where individuals can claim a right to peace. The purpose of this
panel is to examine how this peace might be secured. The focus of the
discussion rests on the question of the link between a particular
methodology of governance, namely democracy and peace.
II. THE CAUSES OF WAR AND PEACE
For centuries mankind has examined the causes of war. Each age
has brought its own theories. One of the newer observed phenomenon
which has heavily engaged political scientists, is the observation that
"[d]emocracies almost never fight each other."" This empirical statement
leads to an examination of whether there is something inherent about the
nature of democracy that produces peace, at least when interacting with
other democracies, and if so, whether the promotion of democracy could
secure a more lasting peace.
Il. THE PROPOSITION THAT DEMOCRACIES ALMOST NEVER FIGHT
EACH OTHER
First, let us look at the proposition that democracies almost never
fight each other. A brief examination of the voluminous literature brought
to bear on this statement reveals that every aspect of the sentence has
received microscopic examination using global data from about 1815
onwards. What do we mean by democracy? Surely there weren't any true
democracies until well into the twentieth century. How long does a
democratic government have to remain in power for the government to be
counted as democratic?5 What do we mean by fight? Should we count
threats of force? Do we require a certain number of bodies before we are
willing to count the conflict as a fight?6 All of these variations have been
examined and yet, as Professor Bruce Russett carefully demonstrates, the
"research result is extremely robust, in that by various criteria of war and
militarized diplomatic disputes, and various measures of democracy, the
3. Id.
4. BRUCE RUSSETr, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-
COLD WAR WORLD 3 (1993).
5. See Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 205-35 (1983).
6. See RUssETr, supra note 4, at 12, & n. 1 - ch. 1.
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relative rarity of violent conflict between democracies still holds up. "7
Another observation is also relevant. "Democracies are not
necessarily peaceful . . . in their relations with other kinds of political
systems [such as autocracies]." The observation about peaceful relations
between democracies does not generally include any observations about
civil wars, the wars which have killed far more people since World War II
than inter-state wars, nor does it look at relative homicide rates within
particular societies or covert actions, so the empirical statement is only one
facet of the overall picture of the use of force. One suggestion I have for
the social scientists that might prove fruitful in filling the gaps is that they
identify which states have had the longest periods of no war at all against
any states, whatever their form of government - that they study these
states and see whether they find any common characteristics. Conversely
they could also study those countries that are most frequently engaged in
international conflict and inquire about the possible characteristics that
cause this perpetual belligerency. Nonetheless, the observation that
democracies hardly even fight each other is an interesting statement. The
essential question then is whether peace among democracies is "a result of
some features of democracy, rather than being caused . . . by [other
factors which may or may not be] correlated with democracy. "9
First, what do we mean by democracy? Professor Samuel P.
Huntington describes its essential feature as "[ellections, open, free and
fair . . . ." In the past century the West's experience with democracy has
also been accompanied by the steady development of other features of
government that appear to go along with open elections: "the rule of law,
a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech,
assembly, religion, and property, . . . [w]hat might be termed
constitutional liberalism . . . ."" In the latest edition of Foreign Affairs,
Fareed Zakaria reminds us that democracy, in the sense of guaranteed
elections, does not necessarily go hand in hand with the other pieces of
constitutional liberalism or vice versa. He points to numerous examples of
popularly elected leaders who "bypass their parliaments and rule by
presidential decree, eroding basic constitutional practices."2 Conversely,
he points to Hong Kong, under British rule, which had almost no electoral
7. Id. at 10.
8. Id. at 11.
9. Id.
10. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 7, 9 (1991).
11. Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of the Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOR. AFF. 22 (1997).
12. Id. at 23.
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participation, except in the last few years, and yet had a fair court system,
and a relatively uncorrupt bureaucracy that protected citizens' basic
rights.' 3 There has been a huge rise in the number of states with elected
governments, particularly in the last 20 years. By some estimates, "118 of
the world's 193 countries are [now] democratic," 4 but this rise in elections
has not been accompanied by a rise in the other institutions of limited
constitutional government. Whether the basic proposition, that
democracies almost never fight each other, will remain true in an era
where an increasing number of elected governments deny basic civil
liberties remains to be seen.
Thomas Jefferson understood the distinction between elections as
such and the other necessary features of limited government when he
observed: "an elective despotism was not the government we fought
for."' 5 Immanuel Kant, in his essay on Perpetual Peace also expanded
upon the link between democracy, peace, and human rights.'6 Indeed he
may be hailed as the modem era's father of this debate.
IV. DOES DEMOCRACY ENCOURAGE PEACE?
A. Theoretical Challenges
Those who espouse the view that "one way to promote universal
and perpetual non-aggression, probably the best and, perhaps, the only
way, is to make democracy an entitlement of all peoples"1' have to contend
with competing theoretical challenges and with other alternative
explanations of the phenomenon of the democratic peace. The overarching
theoretical challenge comes from the structural realists such as Kenneth
Waltz 8 and John Mearsheimer.1' They believe that the behavior of states
is governed by "the structure of the international system and [a particular
state's] position in that structure. "2 They bemoan the end of the Cold War
13. Id. at 29.
14. Id. at 23.
15. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 120 (William Penden ed.
1954) (1787).
16. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 107-39 (T. Humphrey rev. ed. 1983) (1795).
17. Franck, supra note 2, at 88.
18. KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979).
19. John Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War, 15
INT'L SEC. 5-56 (1990).
20. RUSSETr, supra note 4, at 24.
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because it gave "order . . . to the anarchy of international relations." 2'
They believe that "the prospects for international peace are not markedly
influenced by the domestic political character of states, that it is the
character of the state system, not the character of the individual units
composing it, that drives states towards war . . . . "22 "The nature of
states' internal systems of government is seen as nearly irrelevant. .... 23
Believing that there is something inherent about democracy itself,
or democracy combined with liberal constitutionalism, which restrains
states from engaging in war is a direct challenge to the structural realists.
The most obvious conclusion is that the phenomenon that democracies
don't fight each other (but do fight other political systems) must arise from
the normative structure of democracy at least when it interacts with other
democracies but a number of alternative suggestions have been offered to
explain the democratic peace that do not rely on the nature of democracy
or its attendant institutions.
B. Alternative Suggestions to Explain the Democratic Peace
There is only time to mention a few of the alternative explanations
but I would suggest that some of them are wrong and neither of them is a
sufficient explanation of the democratic peace. I will briefly discuss only
four prominent alternative explanations for the democratic peace.
1. Similar Political Cultures Don't Fight
This explanation posits that it is the similarity of the political
culture that restrains war not the particular characteristics of the political
framework. This is simply incorrect. Autocracies fight each other quite
frequently so it cannot be the similarity of the political culture as such that
restrains war.
2. Distance Makes the Heart Grow Fonder
Until 1945 democracies outside Western Europe were few and far
between. Since wars most often occur between neighboring states it is not
surprising that there were few wars between democracies. The problem
with this suggestion is that even where democracies were neighbors they
did not fight, and in the post World War II period, where there are far
more proximate democracies, the phenomenon of the democratic peace still
holds up.
21. John Mearsheimer, Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Aug. 1990, at 37.
22. Id. at 38.
23. RUSSETr, supra note 4, at 24.
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3. Belonging to Common Intergovernmental or Supra-National
Institutions is What Prevents War
There are two replies to this argument. One is that democracy and
liberal constitutionalism encourages "independent centers of power"24 such
as common interstate institutions, so the rise of the institutions themselves
may be seen as incident to the democratic process. The other reply is that
peaceful relations must necessarily precede the creation of the common
institutions. In other words, the institutions arise out of peace; they do not
themselves cause it, though no one doubts that they may help maintain the
peace.
4. Riches Ensure Peace
This explanation holds that the richer a state, the more it has to
lose in the devastation of war, thus the less likely it is to engage in war.
Democracies, at least until the last decade or two, have usually been
wealthy, thus between themselves there are double disincentives against
conflict. This argument is much like the argument that "trade and
investment make peace."25 The problem with both these arguments is that
there are plenty of counter examples. Peace -often exists between states
with weak economic ties and between poor states. Also both trade and
wealth can generate competitive aggression.
V. WILL PROMOTING DEMOCRACY PROMOTE PEACE?
If neither of the alternative explanations is sufficient, what is it
about democracy itself that may persuade us that promoting democracy
will promotn peace? Are democracies more dovish in general than other
political systems either because "the political culture favor[s] . . . the
peaceful resolution of disputes" 26 or because governments have to answer
to the population, especially during wars, which produces the restraint we
seek? The answer sadly has to be no. "[D]emocracies are about as war-
prone and disputatious in general (not towards other democracies) as are
other kinds of states. ,27
What are "the basic norm[s] of democratic theory" 28 that may
restrain war? "[V]oting equality, egalitarian rights to human dignity, the
notion that disputes can be resolved without force, the idea of the consent
24. Id. at 26.
25. Id. at 28.
26. Id. at 30.
27. RussET-r, supra note 4, at 30.
28. Id. at 31.
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of the governed, [and] the idea that resort to force is illegitimate . . . to
secure . . . rights because the institutions linked with liberal democracy
will secure those rights without force." 29 Political opposition and open
discussion are also seen as necessary for good and legitimate policy
making. When other nations are seen as also possessing these political
norms they are perceived as legitimate, possessing restraints on
governmental excesses and not likely to be out to dominate us. We in turn
do not wish to dominate them because their conduct conforms with our
professed norms. The perceived legitimacy of the fellow democratic state
operates as a powerful restraint on any impulse to overthrow such a
government both internally and internationally. When democracies fight
authoritarian states on the other hand, the conflict is often waged in the
name of overthrowing an illegitimate leader. The Gulf War against Iraq
and the United States invasion of Panama are two examples, though
ironically the Gulf War also had to the effect of restoring an autocracy to
power in Kuwait.
There are of course scholars who challenge the very emphasis on
democracy and civil and political rights and question whether those human
rights "should be given priority over economic, social and cultural
rights."3" Professor Anne Orford "question[s] the assumption that the
powerful international institutions operating in the economic and security
areas [which might be seen as, or used for, promoting democracy are
indeed] the bearers of even . . limited liberal versions of democracy and
rights in the post-Cold War era.""' These scholars are not about to jump
on the bandwagon of international institutional intervention.
One scholar who has perhaps tried the hardest to separate out other
possible influences on conflict is Professor Bruce Russett. Through a
series of calibrated tables he has looked at the influence of a variety of
factors as well as the fact of democracy itself on conflict. He tests such
factors as wealth, economic growth, alliances, contiguity, and military
capability ratio. What he finds is that "the effect [of democracy] is
continuous, in that the more democratic each member of [any two possible
warring states] is, the less likely is conflict between them."3" He also
looks at such variables as political stability, structural/institutional
constraints, normative cultural restraints, and even the levels of deaths
resulting from political conflict within countries. From his studies he
29. Id.
30. Anne Orford, Locating the International:. Military and Monetary Interventions After
the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 443, 464 (1997).
31. Id.
32. RUSSEr', supra note 4, at 86.
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concludes that:
The more democratic are both members of a pair of states,
the less likely is it that a militarized dispute will break out
between them, and the less likely it is that any disputes that
do break out will escalate. This effect will operate
independently of other attributes such as the wealth,
economic growth, contiguity, alliance or capability ratio of
the countries.33
Russett concludes that the "results do suggest that the spread of democracy
in international politics . . . can reduce the frequency of violent conflicts
among nations. "14
Perhaps, in the end we also have to proclaim boldly what amounts
to a moral belief, namely that we think voting and respect for individual
rights is simply a preferable system. The studies seem to indicate that
democracy will engender peace, if enough states follow the same pattern,
but it may in any event be worth promoting for its own sake. If the
premise democracies don'tfight each other remains true even in the era of
"The Rise of Illiberal Democrac[ies], " 3 promoting democracy will be a
useful means to peace. If on the other hand the premise breaks down, as
the voting aspect of democracy becomes divorced from liberal
constitutionalism, we shall be forced to look at the broader institutional
framework to find the causes of peace.
The complex issues of how any state, and in particular the United
States, might go about promoting democracy, the dangers of intervention,
and the hazards of various forms of aid, I will leave to my fellow panelists.
33. Id. at 72-3.
34. Id. at 92.
35. Zakaria, supra note 11, title.
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